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Human Health
Conclusions
The occurrence of avian influenza in Asia is unprecedented in
scope and geographical distribution.
There is a clear link between the occurrence of highly avian
influenza in humans and a history of exposure to poultry
infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza.
Where outbreaks are still present in animals, there remains a
risk to public health.
Since the source of infection is of animal origin, control
strategies should be focused on avian species and prevention
in other susceptible animals, including humans.
Continued enhanced surveillance of both animal and human
disease and transparency in sharing of information is
essential for improved decision making.
Recommendations
Veterinary Task Force in charge of preparing emergency
control, contingency, and response plans should include, among
others from other Agencies, individuals responsible for the
public health sector for consultation by these authorities.
Preventing infection in individuals at higher risk of exposure
(veterinarians, cullers, laboratory workers, health care
workers, etc) should involve provision of personnel protective
equipment (PPE), vaccines and antivirals, training, technical
guidance, and advisories. Those individuals who, either
working in specific diagnostic laboratories or in field
control actions may be exposed to high concentrations of
virus, should have baseline serum drawn.
Public awareness programme for avian influenza should focus on
health hazards of handling infected or diseased birds
(farmers, children), or contaminated equipment and material
(egg crates, cartons, bird cages, ...).
Potential public health consequences of selected strategies
for the control of HPAI should always be considered. In
dealing with a zoonotic infection, the veterinary services
should consult with the public health sector when developing
animal health country or regional programmes. Accepted tools
and procedures used for the control of the disease in animals
(e.g., vaccines) should also decrease the risk of exposure of
the infection in the human population at large. As new tools
(e.g., new vaccines) become available these should be assessed
to ensure they do not pose human health risk.
There is no risk to human health from consumption of wholesome
and properly cooked, or processed products, including eggs.
Good hygienic practices should always be applied in food
preparation.
Potentially exposed, known infected, or diseased poultry which
are culled, should never enter the human or animal food chain,
and must be properly disposed of. Eggs produced under systems
of potential or known exposure should likewise not enter food
chains.
Samples of animal origin should be sent to the national
reference veterinary laboratory for preliminary or primary
diagnosis with further dispatch to reference laboratories.
Reference laboratories of OIE, FAO, and WHO, are recommended
to share timely results of their analysis with other
laboratories, the world community and most certainly the
authorities of the country of origin. Samples of the material
and/or isolates should be shared with appropriate laboratories
able to handle the agent in question and possessing proper
import permits. Veterinary laboratories should conduct
diagnostic procedures according to the OIE Manual of Standards
for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines.
External communiquŽs by UN bodies and the OIE, as they relate
to zoonotic disease control where concerted action is
warranted, should deliver concordant messages.
FAO
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